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urgent need to intensify regulatory role of 
the part of CPS regulator- National Pension 
Commission to ensure that operators are 
not lacking behind in practices of various 
mechanisms of CG.
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ABSTRACT
Unlike the previous defined benefit pension scheme in Nigeria, the current contributory 
pension scheme (CPS) is characterised by separation of ownership and management 
of pension fund. In view of agency problem this portends, the need to empirically 
examine corporate governance (CG) practices of operators is of importance for CPS 
survival. Thus, this study examines corporate governance practices of operators of 
CPS in management and custody of the CPS fund. Survey data from 212 managers and 
assistant managers of CPS operators were analysed using one-sample t-test and mixed 
ANOVA. The results showed significant practices of CG mechanisms in the form of board 
independence, director independence, board disclosure and audit committee effectiveness. 
Significant  difference was found in practice of  above CG mechanisms. 
However, there was no significant difference in GC practices among various types of 
CPS operators. Similarly, the interaction of CG mechanisms with CPS operator type was 
also found to be insignificant. Based on the results, good corporate governance practices 
in the management of CPS fund is evident. However, it is recommended that there is an 
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INTRODUCTION
The study examines corporate governance 
practices among the operators (pension 
fund administrators [PFAs] and pension 
fund custodians [PFCs]) of contributory 
pension scheme (CPS) in Nigeria. It is 
established that good corporate governance 
practice facilitates stakeholders’ trust in 
stewardship of the operators of CPS to 
effectively manage the pension fund (Ekpe, 
2016). Unlike the previous defined benefit 
pension scheme, the current CPS in Nigeria 
is characterised by separation of ownership 
and management of pension fund which 
might lead to agency problem. In line 
with standard global practice, National 
Pension Commission [PenCom] as the 
regulator of Nigerian CPS issued a code 
of corporate governance (CG) in 2008 as 
part of its regulatory responsibility. Similar 
to other industry-specific codes of CG 
in Nigeria, PenCom’s code of corporate 
governance aims at protecting the interest of 
major stakeholders in the pension industry 
especially CPS participants (contributors 
and retirees). This is line with corporate 
governance aim of proper management of 
resources under the stewardship of managers 
to ensure that such resources are managed in 
the best interests of their owners. 
CG has widely gained importance in 
management of multitude of enterprises 
where the ownership is separated from 
management. Historically, the advocacy 
role of large pension funds such as 
California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System [CalPERS] and California State 
Teachers Retirement System [CalSTRS] 
was instrumental to the emergence of CG 
(Becht et al., 2003; Cadbury Committee, 
1992; Romano, 1993). The advocacy drive 
evolved due to managerial abuses and 
board tendency to act in their own interests 
rather that of the plan participants who 
own and bear associated risks of pension 
fund failure with the aim of eliminating 
management abuses (Cocco & Volpin, 2007; 
Kowalewski, 2012). Although, literature 
has emphasized the role of CG in boosting 
stakeholders’ trust in Nigerian CPS industry 
(Ekpe, 2016; Okoye & Eze, 2013). Yet, no 
empirical study has so far examined the CG 
practices among the operator of Nigerian 
CPS industry in Nigeria. Thus ,  the study 
fills this gap. 
Despite the long history of CG in 
Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), literature has 
documented weak external and internal 
governance mechanisms among pension 
plans (Kowalewski, 2012). Available 
empirical findings in the banking sector 
indicate that the situation is no different 
among Nigeria banks. This might have 
a spill over effect on the Nigerian CPS 
industry. In relation to Nigerian CPS 
industry, Ekpe (2016) has established that 
managers of emerging CPS industry have 
high tendency to overlap their stewardship 
with other business interests. Other studies 
(Akinkoye & Olasanmi, 2014; Nwannebuike 
& Ike, 2014; Okike, 2007; Proshare, 2014) 
also noted that weak corporate governance 
practices could prevail in CPS industry 
as documented in other industries such as 
banking. These assertions to date are yet 
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to be tested empirically in relation to CPS 
industry. This study gives further insight 
into CG practices of various operators 
(PFAs and PFCs) of the CPS which are 
treated as heterogeneous groups due to 
their distinct function as well as ownership. 
Thus, we examine the implementation of 
four mechanisms of CG and further test for 
differences among operators charged with 
different functions in the management of 
CPS as well.
Research evidence has documented 
mixed and mostly weak evidence on 
level of corporate governance practices 
in Nigeria. More so, the evolving CG 
empirical studies were drawn largely from 
the banking sector with mixed findings 
(Abiola, 2012; Aina, 2013; Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2013; Idam, 2015; Ogbechie & 
Koufopolous, 2010; Turley & Zaman, 2007) 
across countries with no empirical study yet 
on the emerging CPS industry in Nigeria 
(Okoye & Eze, 2013). Although Ekpe 
(2016) recently examined how corporate 
governance may affect stakeholders’ trust 
in CPS industry, the study however fell 
short to indicate the level of CG practices 
in the industry. In view of this gap with 
respect to CG practices in the pension 
industry, this study was conducted to 
provide empirical insight into CG practices 
among the operators of CPS industry. 
Examining the corporate governance 
of Nigerian CPS is significant for some 
rationales. First, CPS has become a vital 
and indispensable part of the Nigerian 
financial system within its 13 years of 
coming into effect. As a such, the need 
to strengthen the corporate governance 
practices of CPS operators to be at be at 
par with other players in Nigerian financial 
system is timely. Second, CPS fund has 
proved to be easier and cheaper domestic 
source of providing funding for corporate 
entities and various tiers of government 
in Nigeria. Thus, CPS has provided the 
needed finance to curtail fiscal sustainability 
challenge that could have unfolded due 
to protracted challenge of declining oil 
revenue- which has been the main source 
of revenue to Nigeria since independence. 
Third, given that CG addresses conflicting 
interests of ownership and management of 
pension fund, examining the CG practices 
of CPS operators can provide guides to 
policymakers and regulators to prevent 
weak implementation of CG that might 
spell doom for the future income payment 
of post-retirements benefits to employees. 
The remaining part of the study is organised 
as follows. The next section focuses on 
related literature on CG generally and 
its mechanisms of board independence, 
director independence, board disclosure and 
audit committee effectiveness specifically 
as well as hypotheses development. The 
materials and method were presented in the 
section that follows. Results and discussion 
of analyses of data and conclusion of the 
study follow in that order.
LITERATURE 
Corporate Governance
According to Cadbury Committee (1992), 
“Corporate governance is the system 
by which companies are directed and 
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controlled”. Corporate governance (CG) 
involved mechanisms put in place to 
monitor the actions, policies, and decision of 
agents of corporation to align the conflicting 
interests of agent (management) and that of 
other relevant stakeholders in the corporation 
(OECD, 2004). Though, good CG is pivotal 
to the activities of pension funds while 
acting in their fiduciary capacity (OECD, 
2004), empirical studies have reported 
mixed findings on the impact of CG. The 
mixed results could be due to difference 
in governance structures and regulatory 
framework among countries with attendant 
tendency of management to consider CG 
as simply a technical matter of low-priority 
that can be evaded when its implementation 
is not convenient as well as use of different 
mechanisms of CG (Lehn et al., 2007; 
Rahman & Bremer, 2016). While several 
mechanisms of corporate governance have 
been identified, this study focuses on four 
mechanisms of CG reviewed below:
Board Independence
Board independence has remained a 
vital mechanism of corporate governance 
mechanism, yet what constitutes the 
independence of board has remained 
mixed (Almania, 2017; Beltratti & Stulz, 
2009; Erkens et al.,  2012; Malik & 
Makhdoom, 2016). In an attempt to clarify 
board independence, Lefort and Urzúa 
(2008) identifies two bases of independence 
of board members to include presence 
of outside directors and professional 
directors. Professional directors are 
mostly experts appointed by institutional 
investors or controlling shareholder while 
outside directors are elected by minority 
shareholders. As a mechanism of CG, 
board independence addresses agency 
problem from separation of owners of the 
resources from managers who might operate 
the firm in their own interest (Romano, 
1993). Thus, the criteria for independence 
of board is associated with whether board 
member are free from undue influence of 
the management or not to discharge their 
responsibilities.
In developed countries with long history 
of CG, much attention has been focused 
on board independence and its committee. 
As such, as high as 80% of boards listed 
companies are considered as independent 
(Gunes & Atilgan, 2016; Weir & Laing, 
2001). Despite the high rate of board 
independence in these countries, the effects 
of board independence remained mixed. For 
instance, Erkens et al. (2012) documented 
negative effect of board independence 
on stock returns of 296 firms across 30 
countries during financial crisis of 2007-
2008. In consistent with Erkens et al., 
Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found similar 
evidence of negative relation between 
board independence and performance of 
banks in selected European countries. 
Almania (2017) examined the impact of 
board independence on leverage of 122 
non-financial Saudi Arabian firms over 
2012-2015. The results show a significant 
but negative impact of independent board 
on firms’ leverage proxied by proportion of 
total debt to total assets. 
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The negative impact  of  board 
independence documented by Almania 
(2017) and Erken et al. (2012) is not 
consistent with study of Fortune Global 500 
firms over 2005-2012 across 18 countries 
by Malik and Makhdoom  (2016). Based on 
data of 33 US firms and 67 non-US firms, 
it was reported that board independence 
enhances transparent decision making. 
Similar evidence was found in a meta-
analysis of 27 studies conducted by Garcia-
Meca, and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010). The 
study reported that board independence 
(proxied as the proportion of independent 
directors on firms’ board) positively related 
to voluntary disclosure. Whereas ,  Vafeas 
(2003) found no evidence to confirm 
that outside directors significantly affected 
CG practices of firms, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2013) examined the impact of board 
independence on firm performance in two 
scenarios: before and after introduction of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002. The results show 
two conflicting evidences of significant 
negative and positive relationship between 
board independence and firm performance 
before and after the Act respectively. These 
conflicting results calls for examining 
the practices of corporate governance 
mechanisms in an emerging industry like 
Nigerian CPS in view of different regulatory 
environment and governance structure 
across countries.  
Director Independence
Director independence is a position of 
being devoid of conflict of interest by a 
director (Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005). 
Extant literature conceptualized director 
independence from multiple perspectives. 
Director independence has been established 
on the basis of nonemployee status of the 
directors in the firm as well as absence 
of financial, family, donor and social 
relationships (Johnson, 2008). Empirical 
findings on director independence has 
largely stand mixed across industries and 
countries. For instance, Kang et al. (2007) 
found that in Australia, 83% of sampled 
companies duly appointed adequate number 
of independent directors in their board and 
board committees as required by Australian 
corporate governance regulations. Wan 
(2003) also examined the influence of 
independent director on board to reduce 
executive pay and boost firm performance. 
The results based on data of US firms 
show that the presence of independent 
director neither reduce executive pay nor 
improve firm performance. Further analysis 
of the sampled firms establish that firm-
industry specific factors largely account 
for difference in executive pay. Whereas, 
studies have also reported significant 
positive relationship between proportion 
of independent directors and debt ratio 
(Jensen, 1986; Abor & Biekpe, 2007).  
On the contrary, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) documented negative relationship 
between proportion of independent director 
on board and performance of firms. In 
contrast, Petra (2005) stated that outside 
independent directors did appear to 
strengthen corporate boards. Besides, 
studies and anecdotal report have recognised 
presence of outside directors on board as 
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a way of attaining director independence. 
Vafeas (2003) noted that the presence of 
outside director was instrumental towards 
proper monitoring of management. Such 
monitoring of management actions a s 
n o t e d  b y  Petra (2005), ensured that 
managers make decision in the best interest 
of stakeholders- to whom the resources under 
their stewardship belong. Thus, the presence 
of independent director is a mechanism 
that minimise agency conflicts between 
owners and managers (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The effect of director-chief executive 
officer (CEO) tie and compensation on 
director independence compromise was also 
examined by Westphal and Zajac (1995). 
It was found that when CEO appointed a 
director, there was a probable risk that such 
director might support the CEO rather than 
to discharge their duty of monitoring the 
CEO. The implication of their finding is that 
under such scenario the independence of 
director may be jeopardized.
However, the option of compensation 
of the independent director may minimize 
the risk based on evidence provided by 
Podder et al. (2013). They examined the 
impacts of director compensation options 
on their independence using 2006-2010 
data of 104 insurance companies in the US 
and found that equity-based compensation 
aligns the interests of independent directors 
and stakeholders they represent. On the 
contrary, Deutsch et al. (2011) noted that 
compensating independent director using 
equity option negatively affected the 
risk taking in board decision–making. 
Notwithstanding failure to locate study 
that relate impact of cash compensation on 
director independence, empirical evidence 
of independent director cash compensation 
on earning management presented by 
Ye (2014) showed positive relationship 
based on 2002-2008 data of Chinese listed 
firms. The finding indicates that higher 
cash compensation may compromises the 
independence of director to effectively 
discharge their oversight on financial 
reporting.
Board Disclosure
Corporate board disclosure has become a 
subject of growing concern (Garcia-Meca 
& Sanchez- Ballesta, 2010). Broadly 
speaking, emerging markets tend to 
be characterized by high level of 
information asymmetry (Uyar & Kilic, 
2012). Such information asymmetry has led 
to distrust in corporate management (Patel 
& Dallas, 2002). Therefore,  Sihombing 
and Pangaribuan (2017) proposed that 
timely information dissemination to various 
stakeholders significantly reduced such 
information asymmetry. Also, Engel et al. 
(2010) stated that presence of reputable 
directors minimized such information 
asymmetry between firms and investors 
as the reputable status offers them some 
discretion on information disclosure (Turley 
& Zaman, 2007). Thus, the need for adequate 
disclosure cannot be under-estimated in 
general and on Nigerian CPS industry in 
particular towards minimizing the effect of 
such information asymmetry. 
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However, poor disclosure of executive 
and non-executive information sensitive to 
market dealings to facilitates stakeholders’ 
confidence, CEO compensation, directors’ 
remuneration, and transactions with 
related-parties were documented in Nigeria 
(Okike, 2007). This may have accounted 
for investors’ reluctance to channel their 
resources to environment where corporate 
disclosure is low (Ejuvbekpokpo & Esuike, 
2013). Therefore, poor level of disclosure 
among firms no doubt constitutes a serious 
threat to the growth of developing countries 
due to loss of confidence by investors to 
inject the needed capital for investment 
(Okpara & Kabongo; 2010). Aina (2013) 
posited that disclosure of remuneration 
of directors and senior executives of 
Nigerian firms eliminates controversy and 
unsustainable pay. On the contrary, Sanda et 
al. (2005) stated that disclosure of reliable 
financial and non-financial information 
enhanced investors’ participation in stock 
of a firm. Adegbite (2012) also noted 
that disclosure improves participation of 
investor in a firm that provided information 
on ownership structure of the firm and 
matters relating to members of board and 
key employees.
Audit Committee Effectiveness                                  
As a board sub-committee, audit committee 
(AC) is a vital mechanism of CG that its 
effectiveness has continued to be a global 
concern. To arrest the concern, several reports 
and professional publications have focused 
on AC effectiveness among CG mechanisms 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992; Deloitte, 
2015; Hong Kong Society of Accountants 
[HKSA], 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2011). Traditionally, AC is established 
to facilitate a continuous communication 
between the board and external auditors 
through regular meetings. Such meetings are 
held to review internal accounting controls 
system and audit process to improve 
financial statements credibility (Rahman & 
Ali, 2006). Besides, audit committee assists 
investors to obtain relevant information for 
decision making based on external audit 
(Okike, 2007). While justifying the need 
for audit committee in a meta-analysed 
study, DeZoort et al. (2002) affirmed that 
AC was vital to protect stakeholders’ 
interests. In a comparative study, Gunes 
and Atilgan (2016) examined the impact of 
AC effectiveness (ACE) on performance of 
Turkish and UK banks during 2006–2010. 
ANOVA results of data obtained from 
10 banks in each of the country showed 
significant difference of effect of AC 
effectiveness on performance (proxied 
by return on asset and return on equity) 
among Turkish banks. Contrarily there 
was no significant differential effect found 
among UK banks. The differential effect 
was attributed to varying independence 
level of AC members in UK (100%) and 
Turkey (19%) due to relatively long history 
of corporate governance in UK compared 
to Turkey. 
Another paradigm of literature has 
focused on the impact of audit committee 
members’ skills on the performance of 
their function. With the aim of comparing 
the effect of AC effectiveness (proxied by 
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independence and expertise) on restatement 
of accounts, Carcello et al. (2011) used 
matched data of 2000-2001 financial 
statements of equal sample (104) for 
restating firms and non-restating ones. The 
results of conditional logistic regression 
showed that the higher the independence 
of the AC, the lower the tendency of 
restatement of financial statements. 
They also found a significant negative 
relationship between AC expertise and 
account restatement with no significant 
effect of CEO involvement in selection of 
AC members on the relationship. McDaniel 
et al. (2002) corroborated that inclusion 
of financial experts as members of audit 
committee improved the focus on financial 
reporting quality far deeper than financial 
literates due to differences in judgement 
of financial experts and financial literates. 
The study established that the differences 
might lead to different basis of opinion on 
financial reporting issues   
In a study of Thai l isted firms, 
Kamolsakulchai (2015) examined effect of 
audit committee effectiveness (proxied by 
members’ expertise) on financial reporting 
quality (exponential of discretional 
accrual) of three industries (Agro & food, 
Technology and industrial) over 2008-
2012. The results show positive significant 
effects of AC expertise on discretional 
accrual with significant difference across 
three industries. Literature has further 
investigated how interaction with other 
control mechanisms affect audit committee 
effectiveness. In a case study conducted 
by Turley and Zaman (2007), interview 
analyses showed that interactions of audit 
committee with internal controls (internal 
auditor and senior management) and external 
controls (external auditor) had effect on the 
potential achievement of audit committee 
effectiveness. Based on the review of related 
studies on the four mechanisms of CG, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:
H1:  there  i s  s igni f i cant  board 
independence practices by operators of 
CPS in Nigeria
H2: there is significant director 
independence practices by operators of 
CPS in Nigeria
H3: there is significant board disclosure 
practices by operators of CPS in Nigeria.
H4: there is significant audit committee 
effectiveness practices by operators of CPS 
in Nigeria. 
Ownership and Corporate Governance
According to Petra (2005), through 
ownership shareholders take control of 
firms. Consequently, there is need for CG 
regulations to take cognisance of corporate 
ownership (Adegbite, 2012). By design, 
there are two categories of CPS operators: 
pension fund administrators (PFAs) and 
pension fund custodians (PFCs). While, 
PFAs are charged with management of the 
CPS fund, the PFCs are the custodians of the 
fund. PFAs are in two sub-categories of open 
PFAs and closed PFAs. Open PFAs manage 
the pension fund of employees engaged by 
unrelated employers while closed PFAs are 
established by employers to manage the 
pension fund of their employees (Pension 
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Reform Act, 2004). Therefore, closed 
PFAs represent a kind of related-parties in 
terms of ownership on the basis that the 
employers that established the PFAs may 
have influence on their activities unlike open 
PFAs where such ownership relationship 
does not exist. The PFCs also have unique 
ownership type as well under the Nigerian 
CPS. As at 2017, all the four PFCs licensed 
to operate as custodians of CPS are fully 
owned by institutional investors (banks). 
Literature has focused attention on 
effect of various ownership type on CG 
practises. For instance, Balagobei and 
Velnampy (2017) asserted that there was 
vital effect of ownership structure on 
corporate governance mechanisms among 
beverage and tobacco firms in Sri Lanka. 
Also, corporate ownership of Bangladeshi 
f i rms was found to  have negat ive 
relationship on board independence largely 
due to family concentrated ownership 
(Hasan et al., 2016). They further reported 
significance difference among various 
ownership types (family, institutional and 
public) on board independence. Whereas 
employer managed pension funds have 
demonstrated poor corporate governance 
practice (Kowalewski, 2012), institutional 
owners have shown high preferences for 
CG through their intervention behind the 
scene (Bushee et al., 2014; McCahery et 
al., 2016). The evidences presented above 
provide arguments that ownership of the 
CPS operators may have impacts on their 
level of corporate practices.  Therefore, this 
study hypothesized as follow:
H5: there is significant difference 
in practices of various mechanisms of 
corporate governance by CPS operators in 
Nigeria.
H6: there is significant interaction 
effect of various CG mechanisms with CPS 
operators type in Nigeria. 
H7: there is significant effect of 
ownership of CPS operator type on CG 
practices in Nigeria. 
MATERIALS AND METHOD
The population of the study covered all 
the 32 operators of CPS which consist 
of 21 open PFAs, 7 closed PFAs and 4 
PFCs as at the end of 2017. The uni ts 
o f  ana lys i s  comprised 212 managers 
and assistant managers of CPS operators 
(PFAs and PFCs). The sample were drawn 
from PFAs and PFCs which are charged 
with the administration and custody of 
CPS fund respectively. With respect to 
measurement of corporate governance, 
studies have used various mechanisms of 
CG as proxies for measurement. While 
some studies have used single of CG 
mechanisms such as board independence 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Chen & Jaggi, 
2001; Malik & Makhdoom, 2016), audit 
committee characteristic (Gunes & Atilgan, 
2016), CEO duality (Duru et al., 2016), 
others have combined various mechanisms 
of CG (Bhagat, & Bolton, 2013; Sang & Il, 
2004). This study therefore adapts measures 
of CG mechanisms of board independence, 
director independence, board disclosure and 
audit committee effectiveness developed 
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by Sang and Il (2004) in a CG study of five 
Asian countries. 
The responses to the measurement 
item were Likert-scaled from between 
1 indicating “strongly disagree” to 7 
indicating “strongly agree”. The instrument 
consists of 22 items covering the above 
corporate governance mechanisms. Six items 
measure board independence, five measure 
director independence, four measure board 
disclosure while seven measure audit 
committee effectiveness. Cronbach’s 
alpha reported by the CG mechanisms 
are board independence (0.906), directors 
independence (0.838), board disclosure 
(0.806) and audit committee effectiveness 
(0.816). The items were tested for validity 
using factor analysis (see Table 1). All items 
adequately loaded on the CG mechanism 
they measure with the loading of 0.40 and 
above, except one of the seven items that 
measure audit committee effectiveness 
(AUDCOM3) which was deleted from 
further analyses. Kaiser Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were 
examined to ensure sampling adequacy 
and significance. For all the four CG 
mechanisms KMO of 0.60 and above and 
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity were 
reported as recommended for sampling 
adequacy and significance respectively 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013; Pallant, 2013). 
The results of reliability and validity test 
is in consistent with study by Ibrahim and 
Zulkafli (2016) that adapted the same items 
in their study. The justification for use of 
items to measure CG is in line  Malik and 
Makhdoom (2016). They suggested the need 
to go beyond secondary data to measure 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
They futher argued that using other than 
secondary data allowed researchers to go 
for other alternative data source such as 
item–response questions to elicit perception 
of relevant players on the extent corporate 
governance practices.
Scholars  have emphasized that 
corporate boards play substantial roles 
in entrenching good GC while acting as 
the guardian of shareholders’ interest 
in oversight of management (Dalton et 
al., 1998). Others (Amrah et al., 2015; 
Lefort & Urza, 2008) argue that board 
of directors and  i t s  commi t t ee  are 
pivotal in internal governance of firm. 
Therefore, this study measures CG based 
on some vital characteristics of the board 
and its committees. In order to analyse 
data collected, one sample t-test was 
used to examine the practices of four 
corporate governance mechanisms (board 
independence, director independence, 
board disclosure and audit committee 
effectiveness) of operators of CPS. Further 
analyses were conducted to examine if 
difference exists in practice of corporate 
governance across the four mechanisms 
as well as among the various type of CPS 
operators based on ownership (open 
PFAs, Closed PFA and PFCs) using mixed 
ANOVA. The use of mixed ANOVA 
accommodates scores generated from 
repeatedly observed sampled cases for the 
four mechanisms of CG to be compared 
(Lindstrom & Bates, 1990). Mixed ANOVA 
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was also appropriate due to its merit to 
test difference among CPS operator type 
(open PFAs, closed PFAs & PFCs) and 
analyse interaction of the two factors (CG 
mechanisms and CPS operator type).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A total of 212 managers participated in the 
survey out of which 155 and 42 were from 
open and closed PFAs respectively. The 
remaining 15 were from PFCs. The average 
tenure of holding managerial position by the 
Table 1
Summary of factor analysis estimates
CG 
Mechanisms
Items Loadings KMO Bartlett test 
of 
Sphericity
Eigen 
Value
% of 
Variance 
Explained 
Chi- 
Square 
Statistics
p-value
Board 
independence BODIND1
BODIND2
BODIND3
BODIND4
BODIND5
BODIND6
0.929
0.925
0.728
0.902
0.927
0.508
0.877 1052.550 0.000 4.179 69.653
Director 
independence DIRIND1
DIRIND2
DIRIND3
DIRIND4
DIRIND5
0.713
0.829
0.754
0.847
0.766
0.779 430.180 0.000 3.069 61.374
Board 
disclosure BODDIS1
BODDIS2
BODDIS3
BODDIS4
0.794
0.842
0.835
0.726
0.780 284.296 0.000 2.566 64.142
Audit 
committee 
effectiveness
AUDIT1
AUDIT2
AUDIT4
AUDIT5
AUDIT6
AUDIT7
0.634
0.777
0.654
0.688
0.731
0.779
0.782 393.545 0.000 3.049 50.049
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis
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respondents was 3.87 years with standard 
deviation of 2.15years. Table 2 reports 
the results of hypotheses (HI, H2, H3 and 
H4) in relation to the practices of the four 
mechanisms of CG tested with one-sampled 
t-test as follow: t (211) = 3.040, p < 0.003; t 
(211) = 15.513, p < 0.000; t (211) = 18.032, 
p < 0.000; and  t(211) = 20.775, p < 0.000 
respectively. The results show significant 
practices of each of the four CG mechanisms 
which indicate their significant practices by 
CPS operators. Thus, hypotheses HI, H2, H3 
and H4 were supported. 
Subsequently, other hypotheses (H5, H6 
and H7) were tested using mixed ANOVA 
to examine the effect of three CPS operator 
types (open PFAs, closed PFAs and PFCs) 
on the practices of CG across the four CG 
dimensions (board independence, director 
independence, board disclosure and audit 
committee effectiveness). The  resul t s 
o f  mixed  ANOVA were  p re sen ted 
in Table 3 and Table 4. As a prelude 
to guide the use of appropriate estimates 
of mixed ANOVA, test of sphericity 
assumption was conducted across the 
repeated measures (CG mechanisms). 
Mauchly’s test showed Chi-Square value 
of 68.069 and p < 0.000 for repeated scores 
across mechanisms of CG (within-subject 
effects) violated the sphericity assumption 
indicating a siginigicant differences in 
variances of the CG mechnisms (Field, 
2013). The violation indicates that the 
F-values of CG mechanisms for the main 
effect and its interaction effect with CPS 
operators type (between-group effect) need 
to be corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction. 
Based  on  Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, the results (F (2.842, 518.809) 
= 25.479, p < 0.000, eta2 = 0.109) of 
Hypothesis H5 showed there was significant 
main effect  difference among   the practices 
Table 2
One-sample t-tests results
 Corporate
 governance 
 Mechanisms
Test Value = 5   
t df
Sig.
 (2-tailed)
Mean
 Difference
95% Confidence
 Interval 
of the 
Difference
     Lower   Upper
BODIND 3.040 211 0.003 0.234 0.083 0.387
DIRIND 15.513 211 0.000 0.905 0.790 1.020
BODDIS 18.032 211 0.000 1.074 0.957 1.191
AUDCOM 20.775 211 0.000 1.021 0.924 1.118
Note: computed using alpha= 0.05
BODIND=Board independence,  DIRIND=Director  independence,      
BODIND= Board disclosure,  AUDCOM=Audit  commit tee  effect iveness
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of four CG mechanisms (Table 3). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that average board 
independence practices (5.235) of CPS 
operators was significantly lower compared 
to other CG mechanisms that reported 
average ranging from 5.905 to 6.074. 
Therefore, Hypothesis H5 was supported. 
For Hypothesis H 6 , the results (F (4.965, 
518.809) = 1.585, p < 0.163, eta2 = 0.015)
showed there was no significant interaction 
effect of CG mechanisms and CPS 
operator type. Thus, Hypothesis H6 
was not supported. Also, the results (F 
(1, 2) = 0.043, p < 0.958, eta2 = 0.000) 
o f  Hypothesis H7 on the main effect 
comparing the practices of CG among the 
three CPS operator types was also found not 
to be significant. Therefore, Hypothesis H7 
was not supported (Table 4). 
The findings from results (H1, H2, 
H3 and H4) showed adequate practices of 
CG among CPS operators in Nigeria. The 
findings of the first four hypotheses are in 
contrast with the poor level of CG reported 
in the Nigerian banking sector (Akinkoye 
& Olasanmi, 2014; Nwannebuike & Ike, 
2014). The findings are also inconsistent 
with the weak practices of CG among 
pension fund in OECD (Kowalewski, 2012). 
With regards to H5 which states there is 
significant difference in practices of various 
mechanisms of corporate governance by 
Table 3
Tests of within-subject effects
Source
Sum of 
Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
CGMechanisms   Sphericity     
  Assumed 50.196 3.000 16.732  25.479  0.000   0.109
  Greenhouse- 
  Geisser 50.196 2.482 20.221  25.479  0.000   0.109
  Huynh-Feldt 50.196 2.539 19.773  25.479  0.000   0.109
  Lower-bound 50.196 1.000 50.196  25.479  0.000   0.109
CGMechanisms
*CPSopertatortype
  Sphericity    
  Assumed 6.245 6.000 1.041  1.585  0.149   0.015
  Greenhouse-  
  Geisser 6.245 4.965 1.258  1.585  0.163   0.015
  Huynh-Feldt 6.245 5.077 1.230  1.585  0.161   0.015
  Lower-bound 6.245 2.000 3.122  1.585  0.207   0.015
Error
(CGMechanisms)
  Sphericity    
  Assumed 411.743 627.000 0.657
  Greenhouse-  
  Geisser 411.743 518.809 0.794
  Huynh-Feldt 411.743 530.558 0.776
  Lower-bound 411.743 209.000 1.970
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CPS operators in Nigeria. The results show 
a significant difference with relatively low 
board independence practices compared 
to other mechanisms of CG under review. 
For H6 on interaction effect of type of CPS 
operators with CG mechanisms, the study 
reported no significant effect. The finding 
is contrary to that of Turley and Zaman 
(2007) that interactions of audit committee 
with internal controls (internal auditor 
and senior management) and external 
controls (external auditor) have effect on the 
potential achievement of audit committee 
effectiveness. As for H7 on the effect 
of ownership of different types of CPS 
operators on CG practices in Nigeria, there 
is no significant effect. This is inconsistent 
with the finding of Balagobei and Velnampy 
(2017) that reported significant effect of 
ownership structure on corporate governance 
mechanisms among beverage and tobacco 
firms in Sri Lanka. The finding is also 
incongruent with study of Bangladeshi firms 
that found negative effect of ownership on 
board independence (Hasan et al., 2016). 
CONCLUSIONS
The study examines practices of corporate 
governance among operators of CPS in 
Nigeria. Despite the preponderance of 
studies related to CG in banking and other 
sectors in Nigerian, there is relatively 
scarcity of attention paid to CG practices 
in the CPS industry.  The paper empirically 
examines board independence, director 
independence, board disclosure and audit 
committee effectiveness o f  operators 
of CPS in Nigeria. The study fills the 
literature gap of presenting empirical 
evidence in relation to practices of CG 
of operators of CPS. The findings showed 
that there exist significant practices of CG 
mechanisms (board independence, director 
independence, board disclosure and audit 
committee effectiveness mechanisms) 
among the CPS operators of CPS. More so, 
there is significant difference in practices 
of CG across the various mechanisms 
of CG. I t  was also found that  CPS 
operators types (PFAs and PFCs) based on 
their ownership perspective do not differ 
with respect to practices of CG. The study 
also reported no interaction effects of CG 
mechanisms and type of CPS operators 
based on ownership. 
T h e  s t u d y  m a k e s  s i g n i f i c a n t 
contributions in a number of ways. Far 
Table 4
Tests of between-subject effects
Source Sum of
Squares
    df Mean
square
F Sig. Partial
Eta
Squared
Intercept 12503.116     1 12503.116 9772.472 0.000 0.979
CPSopertatortype         0.111     2         0.055       0.043 0.958 0.000
Error     267.399 209         1.279
Note: computed using alpha= 0.05
Corporate Governance Practices of CPS Operators in Nigeria 
1105Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 27 (2): 1091 - 1109 (2019)
more than other industries, the strategic 
significance of CG to the performance of 
CPS industry cannot be under- estimated. 
CPS has become a vital aspect of the 
Nigerian financial system. For instance, 
within barely over a decade of coming 
into effect, CPS fund has become a major 
source of finance for corporate entities and 
various tiers of government to maintain 
fiscal sustainability. Similarly, given that CG 
addresses conflicting interests of ownership 
and management of pension fund, examining 
the CG practices of CPS operators can 
provide guide policymakers and regulators 
to prevent weak implementation of CG. The 
finding will also forestall likely future crisis 
similar to ugly experience of the old defined 
benefit scheme in the CPS industry so as to 
safeguard the future income of retirees. 
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